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Abstract
The U.S. dairy industry has operated under a price support program since 1949. 
Between 1949 and 1980, the dairy price support program generally operated without 
incurring large government costs and was an effective price stabilizer. However, since 1980, 
the dairy industry has experienced chronic excess production relative to consumption and 
consequently government purchases under the price support program have been excessively 
large (particularly in the mid-1980s). The tremendous increase in government costs of the 
dairy price support program and a growing dissatisfaction with the program by farmers has 
prompted proposals to modify or replace this program.
This paper examines the potential market impacts of five different dairy policy 
scenarios. The five policies are: (1) a baseline price support program scenario, (2) an 
immediate deregulation scenario where the price support program is eliminated, (3) a gradual 
deregulation scenario where the support prices for dairy products are decreased by 10% per 
year, (4) a target price-deficiency payment program scenario, and (5) a mandatory supply 
control program scenario. A model of the national dairy industry is used to simulate 
quarterly equilibrium price and quantity values at the farm and wholesale levels for each 
policy over the period 1980-90.
The results indicate that there are gainers and losers for each policy option. 
Consumers are better off under the deficiency payment program and both deregulation 
scenarios because prices are lower, which enables them to consume more dairy products. On 
the other hand, consumer are worse off under supply control where, with the exception of 
butter, wholesale prices are at their highest. Farmers, as a group, are better off under the 
supply control and deficiency programs. Farm milk prices and producer surplus are highest 
under these two policies. Producers suffer the most in the immediate deregulation scenario
iii
where both the farm price and producer surplus are at their lowest levels. Tax payers are best 
off under immediate deregulation and supply control, while substantially worse off under the 
deficiency payment program. These results suggest that the relative political weight that 
politicians give to consumers, fanners, and tax payers will be quite important in shaping 
future dairy policy legislation.
IV
An Analysis of Alternatives to the Dairy Price Support Program
Harry M. Kaiser
The U.S. dairy industry has operated under a price support program since 1949. The 
purpose of the program is to stabilize dairy farmer income and lessen the seasonal instability in 
milk prices. Under the program, the government indirectly supports the farm milk price by 
offering to purchase unlimited quantities of storable manufactured dairy products at specified 
purchase prices. The government thus attempts to maintain the market price for raw milk at or 
near the support price by increasing the farm demand for raw milk.
Between 1949 and 1980, the dairy price support program generally operated without 
incurring large government costs and was an effective price stabilizer (Bausell, Belsley, and 
Smith). However, since 1980, the dairy industry has experienced chronic excess production 
relative to consumption and consequently government purchases under the price support 
program have been excessively large (particularly in the mid-1980s). The result has been an 
increase in net monetary outlays for the dairy price support program, which have risen from an 
annual average of $244.3 million for FY 1977-79 to an annual average of $1.67 billion for FY 
1980-89 (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation 
Service). The tremendous increase in government costs of the dairy price support program and 
a growing dissatisfaction with the program by farmers has prompted proposals to modify or 
replace this program. For example, in June 1993 members of the Clinton Administration and 
Congress held a Dairy Summit in Pennsylvania to discuss alternatives to the current program 
that would both help farmers and lower government costs.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the market impacts of several alternative 
federal dairy policies to the dairy price support program. The policy scenarios investigated 
include: (1) a baseline price support program scenario, (2) a deregulation scenario where the 
price support program is immediately eliminated, (3) a gradual deregulation scenario where the
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support prices for dairy products are decreased by 10% per year, (4) a target price-deficiency 
payment program scenario, and (5) a mandatory supply control program scenario. Each one of 
the dairy policies considered has been discussed by some policy and dairy industry leaders in 
the past as an alternative to the existing program. However, most recent research has focused 
on deregulation (LaFrance and de Gorter), voluntary supply control (Dixon, Susanto, and 
Berry; Bausell, Belsley, and Smith), or mandatory supply control (Kaiser, Streeter, and Liu) in 
isolation of one another.
The analysis is based on a quarterly-dynamic econometric-simulation model of the dairy 
industry that includes wholesale and farm markets. The model is used to simulate quarterly 
equilibrium prices and quantities for each policy scenario. The simulation of the five policy 
scenarios is conducted in the sample period from the first quarter of 1980 through the fourth 
quarter of 1990. An in-sample simulation of the 1980s is conducted because this was a time 
when there was a lot of discussion about replacing, or modifying the price support program.
In addition, the exogenous variables do not have to be forecasted for an in-sample simulation.
Conceptual Model
The model divides the dairy industry into a wholesale and farm sector. The retail sector is 
excluded because available national consumption data are commercial disappearance estimates 
at the wholesale rather than retail level. It is assumed that farmers produce Grade A (fluid 
eligible) milk and sell it to dairy wholesalers. There are four types of wholesalers represented 
in the model: fluid milk, frozen dairy products, cheese, and butter manufacturers.1
There currently are two major federal programs that regulate the dairy industry: federal 
milk marketing orders and the dairy price support program. The federal order program is
1 Fluid milk, frozen products, cheese, and butter are expressed on a milkfat equivalent basis in 
the model. Since all quantities are expressed on a milkfat basis, nonfat dry milk is not included 
in the model.
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included in all five policy scenarios and it is assumed that milk handlers are regulated under a 
single federal milk marketing order. The national federal order is captured in the model by 
constraining the prices wholesalers pay for raw milk to be the minimum class prices. Fluid 
milk wholesalers are required to pay the higher Class I price, while cheese, butter, and frozen 
product wholesalers pay the lower Class II price.2 The dairy price support program is 
included in the baseline and the gradual deregulation policy scenarios, but is eliminated in the 
immediate deregulation, deficiency payment, and supply control scenarios. This program is 
incorporated into the model by constraining the wholesale market cheese and butter prices to be 
greater-than-or-equal-to the government purchase prices. Since the government is willing to 
purchase unlimited quantities of these products at the announced purchase prices, the program 
indirectly supports the farm milk price by increasing farm level milk demand. .
The wholesale market for the four dairy products is defined by a set of supply and 
demand functions and equilibrium conditions that require supply to be equal to demand. The 
wholesale fluid milk and frozen product markets have the following specification:
(1.1) Qwd = f(PwISwd),
(1.2) Qws = f(PwISws),
(1.3) Qws = Qwd,
where: Qwd and Qws are wholesale demand and supply, respectively, Pw is the wholesale own 
price, Swd is a vector of wholesale demand shifters, and Sws is a vector of wholesale supply 
shifters. The vector of shifters for the wholesale fluid milk supply function includes the Class 
I price, which is equal to the Class II milk price (i.e., the Minnesota-Wisconsin price) plus a 
fixed fluid milk differential. The vector of shifters for the wholesale frozen products supply
2Most federal milk marketing orders utilize three product classes with Class I being fluid 
products, Class II being soft dairy products, and Class III being hard dairy products. A two 
class system is used in this study, with all fluid products considered Class I and all 
manufactured products considered Class II. Hence, the term "Class II price" in this paper 
refers to the price paid for milk used in manufactured dairy products and is the same as the 
Minnesota-Wisconsin (M-W) price. This assumption is not much of a departure from reality 
since the Class II and Class III prices only differ by a marginal amount.
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function includes the Class II price which is the most important variable cost to dairy 
processors.
The dairy price support program directly affects the wholesale cheese and butter 
markets, where the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) provides an alternative source of 
demand at announced purchase prices. As a result, the butter and cheese wholesale market 
equilibrium conditions are different than those for the fluid milk and frozen wholesale markets. 
The wholesale cheese and butter markets have the following general specification for the case 
where the market is competitive:
(2.1) Qwd = f(PwISwd),
(2.2) Qws = f(PwISws),
(2.3) Qws = Qwd + AINV + QSP,
where: Qwd and Qws are wholesale demand and supply, respectively, Pw is the wholesale own 
price, Sws is a vector of wholesale supply shifters including the Class II milk price, AINV is 
change in commercial inventories, and QSP is quantity of product sold by specialty plants to 
the government. The variables AINV and QSP represent a small proportion of total milk 
production and are assumed to be exogenous in this model.3
As was previously mentioned, the dairy price support program is incorporated by 
constraining the wholesale market cheese and butter prices to be greater-than-or-equal-to their 
respective government purchase prices, i.e.:
(3.1) Pwc > pgc,
(3.2) Pwb > P8b,
3 There are cheese and butter plants that sell products only to the government regardless of the 
relationship between the wholesale market price and the purchase price. These are general 
balancing plants that remove excess milk from the market when supply is greater than demand 
and process the milk into cheese and butter, which is then sold to the government. Because of 
this, the quantity of milk purchased by the government is disaggregated into purchases from 
these specialized plants and other purchases. In a competitive regime, the "other purchases" 
are expected to be zero, while the purchases from specialty plants may be positive. The QSPc 
and QSPb variables are determined by computing the average amount of government purchases 
of cheese and butter during competitive periods, i.e., when the wholesale price is greater than 
the purchase price for these two products.
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where: P8C and P8b are the government purchase prices for cheese and butter, respectively. In 
the two policy scenarios where there is a dairy price support program, four regimes are 
possible: (1) Pwc > Pec and Pwb > Psb; (2) Pwc > Pec and Pwb = P8b; (3) Pwc = Pec and Pwb > 
Psb; or (4) Pwc = P8C and Pwb = P8b. In the cheese and butter markets, specific versions of 
equilibrium condition (2.3) apply to the first regime, which is the competitive case. In the 
second case where the cheese market is competitive, but the butter market is not, the wholesale 
butter price is set equal to the government purchase price for butter and the equilibrium 
condition is changed to:
(2.3b) Qwbs = Qwbd + AINVb + QSPb + Qsb,
where: Q®b is government purchases of butter which becomes the new endogenous variable, 
replacing the wholesale butter price. For the third case where the butter market is competitive, 
but the cheese market is not, the wholesale cheese price is set equal to the government purchase 
price for cheese and the equilibrium condition is changed to:
(2.3c) Qwcs = Qwcd + AINVC + QSPC + Qsc,
where: Qsc is government purchases of cheese which becomes the new endogenous variable, 
replacing the wholesale cheese price. Finally, for the last case where both the cheese and the 
butter markets are not competitive, the wholesale cheese and butter prices are set equal to their 
respective government purchase prices and the equilibrium conditions are changed to (2.3b) 
and (2.3c).
The farm milk market is defined by a milk supply function, i.e.:
(4) Qfms = f(E(Pfm)ISfms)
where: Qfms is farm raw milk supply, E[Pfm] is the expected farm milk price, and Sfms is a 
vector of milk supply shifters. Similar to LaFrance and de Gorter, it is assumed that farmers 
have perfect information on the milk price at the time production decisions are made, i.e., 
E[pfm] = pfrn t 0 deal with simultaneity between price and quantity, two stage least squares is 
used in the estimation.
Under the federal milk marketing order program, milk handlers pay Class I and II
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prices, but farmers receive an average of these prices. That is, the farm milk price is a 
weighted average of the Class prices for milk, with the weights equal to the utilization of milk 
among products:
(5.4) (Pn + d) * Qwfs + Pn * Qwfzs + Pn * Q wcs _|_ pH * Qwbs
pfm  = __________________________________________________________
Qwfs 4. Qwfzs +  Qwcs 4. Qwbs
where: Pn is the Class II price, d is the Class I fixed fluid milk differential (therefore the Class 
I price is equal to Pn + d), Qwfs is wholesale fluid milk supply, Qwfs is wholesale frozen 
product supply, Qwcs is wholesale cheese supply, and Qwbs is wholesale butter supply.
Finally, the model is closed by the following equilibrium condition:
(5.5) Qfms = Qwfs + Qwfzs + Qwcs + Qwbs + FUSE + OTHER,
where FUSE is on-farm use of milk and OTHER is milk used in dairy products other than fluid 
milk, frozen products, butter, and cheese. Both of these variables represent a small share of 
total milk production and are treated as exogenous. There are 13 endogenous variables, which 
in the case of a competitive market regime are: Qwf, Qwfz, Qwcd, Qwcs, Qwbd, Qwbs, Pwf, Pwfz, 
pwc, pwb> pll^ Qfms> ancj pfm. an(j there are 13 equations and identities (see Table 2 for variable 
definitions).
Estimated Model
The wholesale and farm equations (l.l)-(4) are estimated simultaneously using two stage least 
squares. The wholesale equations are estimated using quarterly data from 1975 though 1990 
while the farm milk supply equation uses quarterly data from 1970 through 1990. The 
wholesale equations have a shorter time series because some of the demand shifters (generic 
advertising expenditures) are not available prior to 1975. The data and data sources are listed 
in the appendix of Kaiser and Forker. To deal with simultaneity bias between price and 
quantity, instrumental variables are constructed for all prices (wholesale fluid milk, frozen 
product, cheese, and butter prices, Class II and average milk price) by regressing them on all
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exogenous variables in the wholesale and farm markets. All equations in the model are 
specified in double-logarithm functional form. Estimation results for the structural equations 
are presented in Table 1 with t-values given in parentheses under each coefficient, and all 
variables are defined in Table 2. R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination, DW is the 
Durbin-Watson statistic, and D-h is the Durbin-h statistic.
Wholesale per capita fluid milk demand (Qwfd/POP) is estimated as a function of the 
ratio of the wholesale fluid milk price (Pwf) to the CPI for nonalcoholic beverage (Pbev); per 
capita income (INCOME) deflated by the CPI for all goods; generic fluid milk advertising 
expenditures deflated by the media price index (DGFAD); a time trend (T); and seasonal 
harmonic variables (SINi and COSi). The CPI for nonalcoholic beverages is used as a proxy 
for the price of fluid milk substitutes. Generic fluid milk advertising is included to capture the 
impacts of advertising on fluid milk demand. Similar to Liu et al. and Kaiser et al., a second- 
order polynomial distributed lag over four quarters with both end point restrictions imposed is 
specified for generic fluid milk advertising. The variables SINi and COSi, which represent 
the ith wave of the sine and cosine, respectively (Doran and Quilkey), are included to capture 
seasonality in fluid milk demand.
Wholesale per capita frozen product demand (Qwfzd/POP) is estimated as a function of 
ratio of the wholesale frozen product price (Pwfz) to per capita income; a time trend; and 
seasonal harmonic variables (SINi, COSi, and COS2). Unlike the demand function for the 
three other dairy products, the price of frozen product substitutes produced inferior statistical 
results and therefore is omitted. The specification of the price to income ratio, however, is 
consistent with the zero homogeneity assumption for price and income (Phlips). Since there 
was very little generic advertising on frozen products from 1975 through 1990, this variable is 
not included in the frozen product demand equation. To correct for first-order autocorrelation, 
a first-order autoregressive error structure is imposed.
Wholesale per capita cheese demand (Qwcd/POP) is estimated as a function of the ratio 
of the wholesale cheese price (Pwc) to the CPI for meat (Pmea); per capita income deflated by
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Table 1. Results for the Econometric Dairy Model.
W h o l e s a l e  F l u i d  M i l k  D e m a n d :
In (Qwfd/POP) = - 2.372 - .043 In (pwf/Pbev) + _254 In (INCOME/CPI) + .005 In DGFAD 
(20.0) (-2.6) (6.7) (8.2)
+ .008 In DGFAD.! + .009 In DGFAD_2 + .008 In DGFAD_3 + .005 In DGFAD_4 - .068 In T
(8.2) (8.2) (8.2) (8.2) (-13.6)
+ .021 SINi + .031 COSi + )lwfd
(10.8) (16.2) R2 = .94; DW = 1.5
Wholesale__Frozen__Product__Demand:
In (Qwfzd/POP) = - 4.783 - .178 In (Pwf2/INCOME) - .034 In T -.147 SIN! -.157 COSi 
(43.7) (-4.10) (-3.2) (-31.6) (-34.3)
- .023 COS2 + (1/(1 - .198 L) ) Hwfzd
(-8.2) (1.5) R2 = .97; DW = 1.9
Wholesale__Cheese__Demand:
In (Qwcd/POP) = - 3.365 - .107 In (pw<7Pmea) + .308 In (INCOME/CPI) + .078 In T 
(-4.4) (-1.3) (1.7) (5.5)
-.041 DTP + .260 DUM82.2 “ -412 DUM83.i + .031 COS2 + .461 U_!wcd
(-2.3) (6.3) (-10.0) (6.0) (3.8) R2 = .88; DW = 2.0
W h o l e s a l e  B u t t e r  D e m a n d :
In (Qwbd/POP) = - 3.138 - .166 In (Pwb/Pfat) + .606 In (INCOME/CPI) +.003 In DGBAD 
(-2 .6) (-1.6) (1 .1) (2 .2)
- .00007 T2 - .062 MDP - .267 DUM77.2 - .351 DUM80.2 - .294 DM89>12 + .079 COSi
(-1.8) (-1.5) (-2.8) (-3.6) ’ (-4.4) ‘ (4.7)
+ .033 COS2 + Hwbd
(2.9) R2 = .61; DW = 2.1
Wholesale Fluid__HiJJs__Supply:
In Qwfs = .301 + .138 In (Pwf/(Pn +d) ) - .015 In (Pfe/(Pn +d) ) + .637 In (Qwfs)_x 
(3.7) (6.9) (-3.0) (7.5)
+ .150 In (Qwfs)_4 + .041 COSi + .004 COS2 + (1/(1 + .250 L) ) Hwfs
(1.8) (9.1) (2.5) (1.8) R15 = .96; D-h = -.4
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Table 1. (Continued).
Wholesale__Frozen__Product Supply:
I n  Qwfzs = .496 + .067 I n  (P^/P11) + .261 I n  (Qwfzs)_4 + .058 I n  T
(5.8) (1.0) (2.1) (6.2)
- .117 COSi - .016 COS2 + .379 |l_iwfzs 
(-6.0) (-3.6) (3.0) R:
Wholesale__Cheese__Supply:
In Qwcs = .882 + .360 In (Pwc/Pn ) +.442 In (Qwcs).1 + .531 In (Qwcs 
(1.5) (1.3) (4.1) (5.5)
- .032 DTP + .032 SINi - .024 COSi +.020 COS2 + (1/(1 - .530 L)) 
(-1.6) (3.6) (-3.4) (4.0) (3.8)
Wholesale__Butter__Sagely.:
In Qwbs = 1.277 + .230 In (P^/P11) + .498 In (Qwbs)-! + .004 T - .
(3.4) (1.9) (1.4) (3.6) (-
- .07 9 DTP + .222 SINi + .037 COSi + Hwbs 
(-2.1) (15.3) (1.4)
Farm__Milk__Supply :
In Qfms = 1.793 +.113 In (pfm/Pfeed) - .007 In (Pcow/Pfr) + .096 In 
(6.5) (3.3) (-.4) (1.9)
+ .452 In Qfrns_4 + .002 FARMT - .023 MDP - .042 DTP - .035 COSi +
(5.4) (6.2) (-2.3) (-4.0) (-6.1)
R'
- .109 SIN!
(-2 .6)
2 = .97; D-h =1.4
l_4 - .069 MDP 
(-3.5)
Hwcs
R2 = .96; D-h = .6
055 MDP 
1 .6)
R2 = .87; D-h = .3
Qfms_l
.412 ^fras 
(3 .5 )
.95; D-h =2.0
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Table 2. Variable Definitions for the Econometric Model.
Endogenous Variables (in alphabetical order):
Pfm = farm milk price measured in $/cwt.,
Pn = Class II price for raw milk measured in $/cwt.,
pwb = wholesale price for butter measured in cents/lb.,
pwe = wholesale price for cheese measured in cents/lb.,
pwf = wholesale fluid milk price index (1982 = 100),
pwfz = wholesale price index for frozen dairy products (1982 = 100),
Qfms = raw milk supply measured in bil. lbs.,
Qwbd = wholesale butter demand measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
Qwbs = wholesale butter supply measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
^Qwbs _  Qwbd)^
Qwcd = wholesale cheese demand measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
Qwcs = wholesale cheese supply measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
^Qwcs =  Qwcd)
Qwfd = wholesale fluid milk demand measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
Qwfs = wholesale fluid milk supply measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
(Qwfs =  Qwfd),
Qwfzd = wholesale frozen dairy product demand measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent, 
Qwfzs = wholesale frozen dairy product supply measured in bil. lbs. of milkfat equivalent,
(Qwfzs — Qwfzd) ^
Exogenous Variables and Other Definitions fin alphabetical order);
COSi = harmonic seasonal variable representing the first wave of the cosine function,
COS2 = harmonic seasonal variable representing the second wave of the cosine function,
CPI = Consumer price index for all items (1982-84 = 100), 
d = Class I fixed price differential for raw milk measured in $/cwt.,
DGBAD = generic butter advertising expenditures deflated by the media price index, measured 
in thousand $,
DGFAD = generic fluid milk advertising expenditures deflated by the media price index, measured 
in thousand $,
D-h = Durbin-h statistic,
DM89.12 = intercept dummy variable equal to 1 for 1989.1 and 1989.2, equal to 0 otherwise,
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Table 2. (Continued).
DTP = intercept dummy variable for the Dairy Termination Program equal to 1 for 1986.2 through 
1987.3; equal to 0 otherwise,
DUM77.2 = intercept dummy variable equal to 1 for 1977.2, equal to 0 otherwise,
DUM80.2 = intercept dummy variable equal to 1 for 1980.2, equal to 0 otherwise,
DUM82.2 = intercept dummy variable equal to 1 for 1982.2, equal to 0 otherwise,
DUM83.1 = intercept dummy variable equal to 1 for 1983.1, equal to 0 otherwise,
DW = Durbin-Watson statistic,
FARMT = time trend variable for the farm-level equations, equal to 1 for 1970.1,...,
INCOME = disposable personal income per capita, measured in thousand $,
L = lag operator,
MDP = intercept dummy variable for the Milk Diversion Program equal to 1 for 1984.1 
through 1985.2; equal to 0 otherwise,
pbev _ Consumer retail price index for nonalcoholic beverages (1982-84 = 100), 
pcow = u .S . average slaughter cow price measured in $/cwt.,
Pfat = Consumer retail price index for fats and oils (1982-84 = 100), 
pfe = Producer price index for fuel and energy (1967 = 100), 
pfeed = u.S. average price per ton of 16% protein dairy feed,
Pfr= U.S. index of prices received by farmers;
pmea -  Consumer retail price index for meat (1982-84 = 100),
POP = U.S. population measured in millions,
R2 = adjusted coefficient of determination,
SINi = harmonic seasonal variable representing the first wave of the sine function,
T = time trend variable for the retail and wholesale-level equations, equal to 1 for 1975.1,...,
pfms = error term for the farm milk supply equation,
pwbd = error term for the wholesale butter demand equation,
pwbs = error term for the wholesale butter supply equation,
pwcd = error term for the wholesale cheese demand equation,
|iwcs = error term for the wholesale cheese supply equation,
|iwfd = error term for the wholesale fluid demand equation,
p.wfs = error term for the wholesale fluid supply equation,
pwf*t = error term for the wholesale frozen product demand equation,
pwf” = error term for the wholesale frozen product supply equation,
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the CPI for all goods; a time trend; an intercept dummy variable for the quarters that the 1986­
87 Dairy Termination Program (DTP) was in effect; two intercept dummy variables for outliers 
for quarter 2 of 1982 (DUM82.2) and quarter 3 of 1983 (DUM83.1); and one seasonal harmonic 
variable (COS2). The CPI for meat is included as a proxy for the price of cheese substitutes. 
The dummy variable for the DTP is included because this program substantially reduced cow 
numbers via a government buyout of dairy animals and hence milk available for cheese when 
the program was in effect. Generic cheese advertising is not included in this equation because 
it is not statistically significant. Based on the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation 
functions, a first-order moving average error structure is specified.
Wholesale per capita butter demand (Qwbd/pop) is estimated as a function of the ratio 
of the wholesale butter price (Pwb) to the CPI for fats and oils (Pfat); per capita income deflated 
by the CPI for all items; generic butter advertising deflated by the media price index (DGBAD); 
a time trend; an intercept dummy variable for the quarters that the 1984-85 Milk Diversion 
Program was in effect (MDP); three intercept dummy variables corresponding to outliers in 
quarter 2 of 1977 (DUM77.2), quarter 2 of 1980 (DUM80.2). and quarters 1 and 2 of 1989 
(DM89.12); and seasonal harmonic variables (COSi and COS2). The CPI for fats and oils is 
included as a proxy for the price of butter substitutes. The specification of current generic 
butter advertising yields better statistical results than the second-degree polynomial distributed 
lag specification and is therefore used in the butter demand equation. It appears that consumers 
respond immediately to generic butter advertising and the impact of such advertising is short­
lived. The intercept dummy variable for the MDP captures the reduction in milk availability 
that this program accomplished while it was in effect.
Wholesale fluid milk supply (Qwfs) is estimated as a function of the ratio of the 
wholesale fluid milk price to the Class I price (P1 = Pn + d, where d is the fixed Class I price 
differential); the ratio of the Producer Price Index (PPI) for fuel and energy (Pfe) to the Class II 
price plus the Class I differential; fluid milk supply lagged one and four quarters; and seasonal 
harmonic variables (COSi and COS2). The Class I milk price represents the most important
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variable cost to fluid processors, while the PPI for fuel and energy is used as a proxy for 
variable energy costs. The specification of lagged endogenous variables represents capacity 
constraints, while the seasonal harmonic variables capture seasonality in the fluid milk supply. 
A first-order autoregressive error structure is specified to correct for autocorrelation.
Wholesale frozen product supply (Qwfzs) is estimated as a function of the ratio of the 
wholesale frozen product price to the Class II price (Pn); frozen product supply lagged one and 
four quarters; a time trend; and seasonal harmonic variables (SINi, COSi, and COS2). The 
Class II price is included because it represents the most important variable cost to frozen 
product manufacturers, while the lagged endogenous variables are incorporated as capacity 
constraints on frozen product supply. The time trend is a proxy for technological change in 
frozen product manufacturing, and the seasonal harmonic variables capture seasonality in 
supply. Based on the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions, a first-order moving 
average error structure is imposed.
Wholesale cheese supply (Qwcs) is estimated as a function of the ratio of the wholesale 
cheese price to the Class II price; lagged cheese supply one and four quarters; two intercept 
dummy variables for the MDP and DTP; and seasonal harmonic variables (SINi, COSi, and 
COS2). The Class II price is included since it is the most important variable cost to cheese 
manufacturers, while the lagged endogenous variables represent capacity constraints in cheese 
manufacturing. The two intercept dummy variables correspond to the quarters that the 1984-85 
MDP and the 1986-87 DTP were in effect and captures their respective impacts on reducing the 
milk supply. The harmonic variables measure the seasonality in cheese supply. A first-order 
autoregressive error structure is specified to correct for autocorrelation.
Wholesale butter supply (Qwbs) is estimated as a function of the ratio of the wholesale 
butter price to the Class II price; lagged butter supply by one quarter; a time trend; intercept 
dummy variables for the MDP and DTP; and seasonal harmonic variables (SINi and COSi). 
The Class II price is included since it is the most important variable cost to butter 
manufacturers, while butter supply lagged one quarter is a proxy for capacity constraints in
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butter manufacturing. The time trend is a proxy for technological change in butter processing, 
and the intercept dummy variables for the two supply control programs measure the effects 
they had on reducing milk availability for butter. The harmonic variables capture the 
seasonality in butter supply.
For the farm milk market, the milk supply equation (Qfms) is estimated as a function of 
the ratio of the farm milk price (Pfm) to the price of 16% protein feed (Pfeed); the price of 
slaughter cows (Pcow) deflated by the index of prices received by farmers (Pfr); milk supply 
lagged one and four quarters; a time trend (FARMT); two intercept dummy variables for the 
MDP and DTP; and a seasonal harmonic variable (COSi). The price of 16% protein feed is 
included because it is one of the most important variable costs to dairy farmers, while the 
deflated price of slaughtered cows is a proxy for opportunity costs of milk production. Lagged 
milk supply is included as biological capacity constraints for current milk production, while the 
time trend measures technological progress in dairy farming. The two intercept dummy 
variables capture the reduction in milk supply that occurred during the MDP and DTP, and the 
harmonic variable measures seasonality in milk production. A moving average error structure 
is imposed to correct for autocorrelation.
Regarding statistical fit, most of the estimated equations are reasonable with respect to 
R2 and the signs on all coefficients are as expected. In all but two equations, the adjusted 
coefficient of determination is above .87, and all but three are above .94. The two equations 
that yield the lowest R2 are the wholesale butter demand and supply equations. The wholesale 
butter demand equation has the lowest R2 (.61), and the wholesale butter supply equation has 
an R2 of .87. On the whole, the equations are deemed reasonable for the simulation model.
Model Validation
To determine the validity of the dairy model in evaluating the various scenarios, the model is 
dynamically simulated to assess its ability to replicate historical values for the endogenous
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variables. The time period chosen for this dynamic in-sample simulation is from the first 
quarter of 1980 (i.e., 1980.1) through the fourth quarter of 1990 (i.e., 1990.4). This period is 
also the period used in the simulation and is chosen because it corresponds to a time in which 
there was a lot of discussion of implementing alternative dairy policies.
The dynamic simulation is conducted as follows. First, all exogenous variables are set 
equal to their historic levels for the simulation period. Second, all lagged dependent variables 
are set equal to their actual levels for the previous periods and the system of equations product 
specific versions of equations [(1.1) through (5.5)] is solved simultaneously using the Newton 
method. Finally, the predicted endogenous variables become the lagged endogenous variables 
for the subsequent period of the simulation. This process is repeated until the last period of the 
simulation (1990.4) is reached.
Table 3 shows the root-mean-square-percent simulation error (RMSPE), as well as the 
actual and simulated average values for all of the endogenous variables in the model.
Generally, the RMSPEs for the supply and demand quantities are quite reasonable. All 
wholesale and farm supply and demand quantities have RMSPEs under 8.1%. Moreover, 
most o f the quantity variables have RMSPEs under 5%. With respect to prices, the RMSPEs 
tend to be somewhat higher, ranging from a low of 2.7% for the wholesale butter price to a 
high of 11.6% for the wholesale cheese price. Finally, the RMSPE for CCC purchases is 
87.2%. While this may appear high, it is due to the small magnitude of this variable, i.e., a 
small deviation from the actual value leads to a large RMSPE. Because the simulation model is 
to be used for comparing the differences among various dairy policy scenarios rather than for 
prediction, the model is deemed reasonable for this purpose.
Government Dairy Policy Scenarios
There are five policy scenarios considered here: (1) baseline current program, (2) 
immediate deregulation through abolishing the dairy price support program, (3) gradual
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Table 3. Quarterly Averages for Actual and Simulated Endogenous Variables from the 
Dynamic Simulation and Root-Mean-Square Percent Errors.
Root-Mean
Actual Simulated Square
Endogenous Variable Unit Average Average Percent-Error
Fluid milk demand 
Frozen product demand 
Cheese demand 
Cheese supply 
Butter demand 
Butter supply 
Wholesale fluid milk price 
Wholesale frozen price 
Wholesale cheese price 
Wholesale butter price 
Class II price 
Farm milk supply 
Farm milk price 
CCC total
bil lbs 13.04
bil lbs 3.20
bil lbs 8.93
bil lbs 9.72
bil lbs 4.69
bil lbs 6.38
1982=100 104.28
1982=100 106.36
cents/lb 1.33
cents/lb 1.38
$/cwt 11.94
bil lbs 34.95
$/cwt 13.10
bil lbs 2.50
13.05 0.9
3.20 2.5
8.91 3.8
9.33 5.2
4.64 7.9
6.40 8.1
102.82 11.3
106.57 4.6
1.33 11.6
1.37 2.7
11.82 10.7
34.57 2.2
12.77 9.3
2.17 87.2
deregulation by lowering the government purchases prices for cheese and butter by 10% per 
year, (4) deficiency payment program, and (5) mandatory supply control program. For each 
scenario, it is assumed that the policy was in effect for the period 1980.1 through 1990.4. 
Under all five policy scenarios, the federal milk marketing order system of classified pricing is 
maintained. The following discusses the assumptions for each policy scenario.
In the baseline policy scenario, it is assumed that purchase price adjustments each year 
are based on the actual mandated levels under legislation from 1980 through 1990. That is, the 
government purchase prices for cheese and butter are set equal to their actual levels for this 
period. The baseline represents the historical simulation scenario of actual policy from which 
the alternative policies should be compared.
The immediate deregulation scenario assumes that the dairy price support program is 
abolished at the beginning of 1980. In this case, the model is modified by setting the purchase
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prices for cheese and butter to zero. In essence, this is equivalent to the government ceasing its 
purchases of storable dairy products under the price support program.
Because it is unlikely that the government would abolished the dairy price support 
program immediately, a second deregulation scenario is included which phases out the program 
more gradually. Under this scenario, it is assumed that the government continues to purchase 
cheese and butter from willing sellers, but the purchase prices for both products are reduced by 
10% each year after 1980. This gradual deregulation is not as disruptive to the wholesale and 
farm markets, and would likely be more politically acceptable than the immediate abolishment 
of the price support program.
The deficiency payment program scenario assumes that the dairy price support program 
is abolished and replaced by a $13.00 per hundredweight target price for the farm milk price. 
The model is modified by adding the following requirement: if  the simulated farm milk price 
for any quarter is below $13.00 per hundredweight, then a deficiency payment is added to the 
milk price to make the effective price $13.00 and the model is resolved for that quarter. On the 
other hand, if the farm milk price for any quarter is at or above $13.00 per hundredweight, 
then no deficiency payment is made.
In the supply control scenario, it is assumed that the dairy price support program is 
eliminated and the government instead directly supports the farm milk price at $13.00 per 
hundredweight by restricting the milk supply. It is assumed that the government's ability to 
control supply is perfect, which is a reasonable assumption since the government could simply 
not pay farmers for over-quota milk sales. The model is modified by adding the following 
requirement: if the simulated farm milk price for any quarter is less than $13.00 per 
hundredweight, then 50 million pounds of milk is subtracted from the milk supply and the 
model is resolved given the new milk supply level. This iterative procedure of reducing the 
milk supply in 50 million pound increments is continued until the farm milk price is $13.00 or
more.
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Results
The equilibrium quantities and prices for each of the five scenarios are simulated over the time 
period 1980.1 through 1990.4. The results of the five policy scenario are given in Table 4, 
which reports the baseline results and the percentage change in the quarterly average quantities 
and prices from the baseline scenario.
Not surprisingly, the milk supply is the lowest in the supply control scenario (3.7% 
lower than the baseline) and highest in the deficiency payment program scenario (1.1% higher 
than baseline), as indicated in Table 4. The reason milk supply is highest in the deficiency 
payment scenario is due to the farm price being the highest in this case compared with all other 
policies that do not restrict supply. The milk supply under the two deregulation scenarios is 
quite comparable. In the case of immediate deregulation, the milk supply is about 2.7% lower, 
on average, than the baseline, while the milk supply under gradual deregulation is about 2% 
lower than the baseline. Under all five policies, milk supply is increasing over the period 
1980-90, which is primarily due to improved technology.
The farm milk price is highest under the supply control policy, averaging almost 6% 
higher than the price in the baseline (Table 4). On the other hand, the farm price is the lowest 
in the immediate deregulation scenario, where it is about 7% lower than the baseline. It is 
interesting to note, however, that in the case of immediate deregulation, the farm price is much 
lower than the baseline price at the beginning of the simulation, but is closer to the baseline 
towards the end of the simulation after most adjustments to deregulation have been made. The 
farm milk price in the gradual deregulation scenario is 5.4% lower than the baseline, while the 
farm price under the deficiency payment policy is 1.8% higher than the baseline, on average.
In addition to having the lowest farm milk price, the immediate deregulation policy also 
produces the most price volatility, having a coefficient of variation for the farm price of 13.3%. 
The deficiency payment program is at the other extreme in terms of farm price variability with a 
coefficient of variation of .1%. The baseline, gradual deregulation, and supply control policies
Table 4. Endogenous Variables Under the Five Dairy Policy Scenarios as a Percent of their Respective Baseline Values.
Endogenous Variable Unit
Baseline
(quarterly
average)
Immediate 
Deregulation 
(% change)
Gradual 
Deregulation 
(% change)
Target Price 
Deficiency 
Payment 
{% change)
Supply 
Control 
(% change)
Fluid milk demand bil lbs 13.05 0.25 0.19 0.74 -0.18
Frozen product demand bil lbs 3.20 0.62 0.47 1.87 -0.45
Cheese demand bil lbs 8.91 0.85 0.64 2.62 -0.69
Cheese supply bil lbs 9.33 -0.96 -1.08 0.73 -2.43
Butter demand bil lbs 4.64 6.96 5.04 9.25 5.05
Butter supply bil lbs 6.40 -14.21 -10.09 -12.55 -15.60
Wholesale fluid milk price 1982=100 102.82 -5.47 -4.27 -15.64 4.13
Wholesale frozen price 1982=100 106.57 -3.65 -2.86 -10.65 2.76
Wholesale cheese price cents/lb 1.33 -6.95 -5.31 -21.28 6.38
Wholesale butter price cents/lb 1.37 -28.58 -22.15 -37.25 -21.18
Class II price $/cwt 11.82 -7.80 -6.06 -22.06 6.01
Farm milk supply bil lbs 34.57 -2.74 -2.04 1.09 -3.65
Farm milk price $/cwt 12.77 -6.97 -5.42 1.83 5.86
CCC total1 bil lbs 2.25 NA -47.77 NA NA
Producer surplus bil $ 3.97 -9.37 -7.32 3.21 3.84
Government cost2 bil $ 0.28 NA -64.29 1,478.57 NA
Deficiency payment3 $/cwt 2.82
1In the immediate deregulation, deficiency payment, and supply control scenarios, there are no CCC purchases.
^Government costs for the baseline and gradual deregulation scenarios are calculated as the product of the purchase price for cheese times total CCC 
purchases. Government costs of the deficiency payment program are calculated as the product of the deficiency payment times milk supply. There are no
government costs for the immediate deregulation and supply control scenarios.
3The number for the deficiency payment is the actual average payment on a S/cwt. basis rather than a percentage change basis.
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have coefficient of variations for the farm price of 8.5%, 11.7%, and 5.4%, respectively.
Regarding farm welfare, producers are best off in the supply control scenario, where 
producer surplus is 3.8% higher, on average, than the baseline (Table 4). The deficiency 
payment program is close behind the supply control program in this regard, with producer 
surplus being 3.2% higher, on average, than the baseline. Dairy farmers are worse off, as a 
group, under both deregulation scenarios. Under immediate deregulation, producer surplus is 
9.4% lower than the baseline, while gradual deregulation results in producer surplus being 
7.3% lower than the baseline. For all five policies, there is a general upward trend in producer 
surplus over time, which is due to a positive trend in milk supply. These results suggest that 
producers, as a group, would favor supply control and the deficiency payment program over 
the current price support program, but would not favor deregulation.
The cost of each program is another important dimension of any policy analysis. 
Government costs for the baseline and the gradual deregulation scenarios are calculated as the 
product of the purchase price for cheese (converted to a dollars per hundredweight of raw milk 
basis) times total CCC purchases on a milkfat equivalent basis.4 Government costs for the 
deficiency payment program are computed as the product of the deficiency payment (dollars per 
hundredweight) times the farm milk supply. There are no government costs for the immediate 
deregulation, or the supply control scenarios.
The simulation indicates that the deficiency payment program is by far the most 
expensive for the government (Table 4). Government costs for this program average $4.4 
billion per quarter, which is 1,478% higher than the $.28 billion per quarter that the baseline 
policy costs. This policy, therefore, would obviously be politically unacceptable especially 
considering current federal budget deficit pressures. This does not mean that any deficiency
4 The purchase price for butter is not used here because butter is a jointly produced product 
with nonfat dry milk, and one needs the nonfat dry milk purchase price to convert these two 
products to a milk equivalent basis. Since nonfat dry milk is not included in the model, one 
can not compute the milk equivalent purchase price for butter and nonfat dry milk. The use of 
the cheese purchase price only to measure monetary costs to the CCC is reasonable since the 
purchase prices are quite close when converted to a milk equivalent measure.
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payment program would be politically unacceptable because one could cut the costs by 
lowering the target price of $13.00, and/or requiring some sort of supply control by farmers to 
receive the benefits of the program. Gradual deregulation would save the tax payers money 
relative to the baseline.
Purchases of dairy products by the CCC under the gradual deregulation scenario are 
47.8% lower than they are under the baseline. Government costs in this case are 64.3% lower, 
on average, than the baseline because purchase prices are also lower than the baseline. 
Consequently, if the government would have started to decrease the purchases prices in 1981 
by 10% per year, government purchases and costs of the dairy price support program would 
not have skyrocketed like they actually did. The best policies in terms of reducing government 
costs are the immediate deregulation and supply control policies, which have no government 
costs associated with them. Given the current government cost cutting atmosphere in 
Washington, the supply control and deregulation policy options might attract some interest.
Regarding the wholesale market, commercial demand is the highest under the 
deficiency payment program, where wholesale demand for all products (fluid milk, frozen 
products, cheese, and butter) is 2.8% higher than what it is in the baseline. This is due to the 
fact that average wholesale prices for all four products are the lowest in this scenario (see Table 
4). Commercial wholesale demand is also higher under the two deregulation scenarios 
compared to the baseline. Wholesale demand for all products is 1.5% and 1.1% higher for the 
immediate deregulation and gradual deregulation policies, respectively, than the baseline. This 
is due to the wholesale prices for all products being lower under deregulation relative to the 
baseline. While fluid milk, frozen product, and cheese demand is lower in the supply control 
scenario than the baseline, butter demand is actually 5.1% higher. This seemly un-intuitive 
result is explained by looking at the wholesale butter price, which is 21.2% lower than the 
baseline. The reason for the lower butter price is because there is no support program. This 
result suggests that the market value for butter is substantially lower than what was reflected by 
the butter purchase price from 1980-90. It is interesting that this does not happen to the
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wholesale cheese price, which is 6.4% higher than the baseline.
Extrapolating the wholesale results to the retail level, it appears that consumers would 
favor the deficiency payment program over all other policies because it leads to the lowest 
prices. Under the deficiency payment program, the wholesale fluid milk price is 2.9 times 
lower, the wholesale frozen product price is 2.9 times lower, the wholesale cheese price is 3.1 
times lower, and the wholesale butter price is 1.3 times lower than the policy with the next 
lowest price. However, this tremendous magnitude of price advantage to consumers of the 
deficiency payment program would likely be offset by the large tax burden required to pay for 
the program. Since consumers are also taxpayers, they would obviously find this an 
unattractive aspect of the deficiency payment program. Consumers are better off under the two 
deregulation scenarios than the baseline. Regarding immediate deregulation, wholesale fluid 
milk, frozen product, cheese, and butter prices are 5.5%, 3.7%, 7%, and 28.6% lower than 
what they are in the baseline. All wholesale prices for gradual deregulation are also lower than 
the baseline, but slightly higher than the immediate deregulation case (see Table 4). Wholesale 
fluid milk, frozen product, and cheese prices are higher in the supply control scenario than the 
baseline. The wholesale butter price, however, is lower under supply control than the 
baseline.
Summary
The purpose of this paper was to examine the potential market impacts of five different dairy 
policy scenarios. The five policies were: (1) a baseline price support program scenario, (2) a 
deregulation scenario where the price support program is eliminated, (3) a deregulation 
scenario where the support prices for dairy products are decreased by 10% per year, (4) a 
target price-deficiency payment program scenario, and (5) a mandatory supply control program 
scenario. A model of the national dairy industry was used to simulate quarterly equilibrium 
price and quantity values at the farm and wholesale levels for each policy over the period 1980-
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The results indicated that there are gainers and losers for each policy option.
Consumers are better off under the deficiency payment program and both deregulation 
scenarios because prices are lower, which enables them to consume more dairy products. On 
the other hand, consumer are worse off under supply control where, with the exception of 
butter, wholesale prices are at their highest. Farmers, as a group, are better off under the 
supply control and deficiency programs. Farm milk prices and producer surplus are highest 
under these two policies. Producers suffer the most in the immediate deregulation scenario 
where both the farm price and producer surplus are at their lowest levels. Tax payers are best 
off under immediate deregulation and supply control, while substantially worse off under the 
deficiency payment program. These results suggest that the relative political weight that 
politicians give to consumers, farmers, and tax payers will be quite important in shaping future 
dairy policy legislation.
90.
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